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Financial Storage Rights in Electric Power Networks
Daniel Mun˜oz-A´lvarez† · Eilyan Bitar††
Abstract The decreasing cost of energy storage technologies coupled with
their potential to bring significant benefits to electric power networks have
kindled research efforts to design both market and regulatory frameworks to
facilitate the efficient construction and operation of such technologies. In this
paper, we examine an open access approach to the integration of storage,
which enables the complete decoupling of a storage facility’s ownership struc-
ture from its operation. In particular, we analyze a nodal spot pricing system
built on a model of economic dispatch in which storage is centrally dispatched
by the independent system operator (ISO) to maximize social welfare. Con-
comitant with such an approach is the ISO’s collection of a merchandising
surplus reflecting congestion in storage. We introduce a class of tradable elec-
tricity derivatives – referred to as financial storage rights (FSRs) – to enable
the redistribution of such rents in the form of financial property rights to stor-
age capacity; and establish a generalized simultaneous feasibility test to ensure
the ISO’s revenue adequacy when allocating such financial property rights to
market participants. Several advantages of such an approach to open access
storage are discussed. In particular, we illustrate with a stylized example the
role of FSRs in synthesizing fully hedged, fixed-price bilateral contracts for
energy, when the seller and buyer exhibit differing intertemporal supply and
demand characteristics, respectively.
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1 Introduction
The increased penetration of supply derived from variable renewable energy
resources, coupled with the recent decline in the cost of electric energy storage
technologies, has brought about an opportunity to significantly reduce the cost
of managing the electric power system through careful planning, deployment,
and operation of storage resources [13]. Broadly, the short-run value of energy
storage derives from its ability to arbitrage energy forward in time, enabling
both the absorption of power imbalances on short time scales and the more
substantial reshaping of supply and demand profiles over longer periods of
time. The extent to which the deployment of a collection of energy storage
devices might benefit the power system depends critically, however, on the
collective sizing, placement, and operation of said devices [2]. The challenge
resides in the design and implementation of electricity markets and instruments
that induce strategic expansion and operation of storage in a manner that is
consistent with the maximization of social welfare over both the long and short
run, respectively.
The coordinated optimal dispatch of a collection of distributed energy stor-
age resources clearly offers the possibility of a sizable reduction in the cost of
servicing demand by reshaping it in such a manner as to alleviate both trans-
mission congestion and the reliance on peak power generation [28]. Of interest
then is the characterization of mechanisms for the integration of storage, which
encourage its efficient operation. And of critical importance to this effort is
the resolution of the question: who commands the storage? Among the vari-
ety of possible answers to this question, there are two extremes – differing in
terms of the degree of government intervention – which we naturally refer to
as competitive and regulated. Each implies a distinct mechanism for both the
operation of the physical storage facilities and the remuneration of the services
provided.
Broadly, the competitive or market-based operation of storage entails a de-
centralized operating paradigm in which storage owners pursue their own ra-
tional (profit maximizing) interests in the spot energy market. A shortcom-
ing of such approach to storage integration derives from the uncertainty in
revenue that storage owner-operators might obtain from the spot market.
Energy storage is a capital intensive technology. And several recent stud-
ies [10,29,34,38] have indicated that the risk of incomplete capital cost recovery
due to such revenue uncertainty may serve to inhibit investment in storage fa-
cilities. Sioshansi [33] also goes on to show that a complete reliance on the spot
energy market to guide the integration of storage may lead to its substantial
underutilization relative to the social optimum, as strategic owner-operators
of storage will naturally endeavor to preserve intertemporal price differences
for purposes of arbitrage.
The regulated operation of storage, on the other hand, calls for a central-
ized operating paradigm in which storage is treated as a communal asset that
is centrally dispatched by the Independent System Operator (ISO) to maxi-
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mize social welfare subject to its physical constraints.1 The socially optimal
dispatch of storage, in concert with conventional generation and transmission,
naturally improves upon the welfare of the system in the short run. Accord-
ingly, such an approach to the operation of storage necessitates the creation
of a mechanism capable of extracting and redistributing the value added by
storage back to the owners of the responsible storage facilities. Towards this
end, we propose a market mechanism founded on the definition of tradable fi-
nancial instruments, which monetize property rights to storage capacity made
available to the ISO for centralized operation. Such an approach resembles
the regulation and operation of transmission in the majority of US electricity
markets, which entails the centrally optimized operation of the transmission
network subject to the locational marginal pricing of energy, and the allo-
cation of financial transmission rights that monetize property rights to said
transmission capacity [1, 15, 17, 23, 24].
1.1 Open Access Energy Storage
There has been recent activity in both academia and industry to identify
alternative paradigms to support the efficient integration of storage into power
system operations [28, 34]. One stream of literature centers on an open access
approach to the integration of storage; or more simply, open access storage
(OAS) [12, 34, 37]. Loosely, we refer to OAS as a regulatory framework in
which energy storage facilities are treated as communal assets accessible by all
participants in the wholesale energy market.
To the best of our knowledge, only two concrete approaches to OAS have
been proposed. He et al. [12] proposes a market framework where storage own-
ers sell physically binding rights to their storage capacity through sequential
auctions coordinated by the ISO. The collection of physical rights, which are
defined as a sequence of nodal power injections within a specified time hori-
zon, determine the actual operation of the storage. As such, the physical rights
associated with a particular storage facility must be collectively feasible with
respect to the corresponding physical device constraints. While such physi-
cal rights might be used by market participants to execute price arbitrage or
mitigate the cost of honoring existing contractual energy commitments, there
are several important limitations. First, the ability of a market participant to
leverage on a physical storage right depends on her location within the network
relative to the storage facilities. Such restriction could serve to limit market
access. Second, the eventual physical dispatch of storage is determined by a
sequence of auctions – the outcome of which is likely to substantially deviate
from the socially optimal dispatch, because of strategic interactions between
parties bidding for physical storage rights.
Closer to our proposal, Taylor [37] suggests an approach to OAS that cen-
ters on a paradigm in which storage owners sell financially binding rights to
1 The PJM Interconnection has explored a similar regulatory framework in which energy
storage would be operated and compensated traditionally like a transmission asset [28].
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their storage capacity through an auction coordinated by the ISO. The ISO is
charged with the task of operating storage in a socially efficient manner – not
unlike its non-discriminatory operation of the transmission network. As finan-
cial rights, they do not interfere with the optimal operation of storage, but
rather, they represent entitlements to portions of the merchandising surplus
collected by the ISO. A central component of the proposal in [37] is the defi-
nition of the financial rights in terms of the shadow prices associated with the
physical constraints on the storage facilities. This is analogous to the defini-
tion of flowgate rights (FGRs) [6–8] in the context of open access transmission.
And, as a result, such a definition of financial storage rights is naturally en-
dowed with advantages and disadvantages comparable to those of FGRs in the
context of transmission. We refer the reader to Section 3.4 and [18, 26] for a
more detailed discussion on such issues.
1.2 Contribution
We propose a regulatory framework to enable open access storage, which cen-
ters largely on the concept of financial storage rights (FSRs). Broadly speak-
ing, FSRs can be interpreted as financial property rights to storage capacity;
or, more accurately, as financial entitlements (or obligations) to portions of
the storage congestion rent collected by the ISO under the socially optimal
dispatch of storage capacity. Being defined as such, FSRs enable the complete
decoupling of a storage facility’s ownership from its physical operation. More-
over, the specific form of FSRs that we propose – viz. a sequence of nodal
power injections and withdrawals that yield its holder a payment according
to the corresponding sequence of nodal spot prices – provides market par-
ticipants the ability to perfectly hedge physical or financial energy positions
against intertemporal price risk in the spot market.2 Such hedging capabili-
ties represent a natural complement to financial transmission rights (FTRs)
and their ability to hedge spatial price risk across the network. What distin-
guishes such financial instruments from standard forward energy contracts is
the fact that they are issued under the physical cover of transmission and stor-
age capacity, and are settled against the merchandising surplus collected by
the ISO. Accordingly, in Section 3.5, we establish a generalized simultaneous
feasibility test (SFT), which constrains the joint allocation of financial trans-
mission and storage rights in such a manner as to guarantee the ISO’s revenue
adequacy. Namely, any simultaneously feasible collection of transmission and
storage rights are guaranteed to yield a rent that does not exceed the merchan-
dising surplus collected by the ISO. A positive attribute of the proposed SFT
is that it enables the allocation (auction) of FSRs at nodes without physical
storage capacity – a feature which genuinely democratizes access to storage
by all market participants.
2 Such a definition of FSRs represents a financial analog to the physical storage rights
proposed by He et al. [12], and is in contrast to the constraint-based financial rights proposed
in [37].
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1.3 Organization
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the
multi-period economic dispatch problem with storage, and delineate its opti-
mality conditions. In Section 3, we formally introduce the concept of financial
storage rights, and establish a general test for simultaneous feasibility, which
restricts the allocation of both financial transmission and storage rights in such
a manner as to ensure the ISO’s revenue adequacy. In Section 4, we illustrate
with a stylized example the role of FSRs in synthesizing flexible, fully hedged,
fixed-price bilateral contracts for energy. We close with a discussion on direc-
tions for future research in Section 5. All mathematical proofs are included in
the Appendix to the paper.
2 Models and Formulation
2.1 Notation
Let R denote the set of real numbers and R+ the non-negative real numbers.
Denote the transpose of a vector x ∈ Rn by x⊤. Let xi denote the i
th entry
of a vector x ∈ Rn. We define by 1 a column vector of all ones and by ei
the ith standard basis vector of dimension appropriate to the context. For two
matrices A,B ∈ Rm×n of equivalent dimension, we denote their Hadamard
product by A ◦ B. Given a matrix A ∈ Rm×n, we write A = 0 to denote
entrywise equivalence to zero.
2.2 Network Model
Consider a transmission network defined on a set of n nodes (buses) connected
by m edges (transmission lines). The associated graph of the network is as-
sumed connected. The nodes are indexed by i = 1, 2, . . . , n. We operate under
the assumption of a linear model of steady state power flow defined by the
so called DC power flow approximation, where the vector of nodal power in-
jections is linearly mapped to a vector of (directional) power flows along the
m transmission lines through the mapping H ∈ R2m×n, commonly referred
to as the shift-factor matrix. Let c ∈ R2m+ denote the corresponding vector of
transmission line capacities. It follows that the set of feasible power injections
is described by the polytope P(c) ⊂ Rn,
P(c) =
{
v ∈ Rn
∣∣ Hv ≤ c, 1⊤v = 0} . (1)
One can readily verify the compactness of P(c), as rank(H) = n − 1 and 1⊤
is linearly independent from the rows of H .
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2.3 Cost Model
At the core of the formulation considered in this paper is the problem of
multi-period economic dispatch over N discrete time periods, which we index
by k = 0, . . . , N − 1. We measure the cost and benefit of the net injection
vector v(k) ∈ Rn at time k according to
C(v(k), k) =
n∑
i=1
Ci(vi(k), k),
Each component function Ci(v, k) is assumed to be increasing, convex, and dif-
ferentiable in v overR. Moreover, each function is assumed to satisfy Ci(0, k) =
0, Ci(v, k) > 0 for v > 0, and Ci(v, k) < 0 for v < 0. This implies that Ci(v, k)
represents the convex cost of generation for v > 0 at node i and time k. Con-
versely, −Ci(v, k) represents the concave benefit of consumption for v < 0 at
node i and time k. Finally, the component functions {Ci(·, k)} to allowed to
vary with time in order to capture the potential variation in the nodal demand
preferences over time. We refer the reader to Wu et al. [40] for a more detailed
explanation of this model.
2.4 Energy Storage Model
We consider an arbitrary collection of n perfectly efficient energy storage de-
vices connected to the transmission network, where we associate with each
node i a storage device with energy capacity bi ∈ R+. We denote by b =[
b1, . . . , bn
]⊤
the vector of nodal energy storage capacities. The collective stor-
age dynamics are naturally modeled as a linear difference equation
z(k + 1) = z(k)− u(k) (2)
for k = 0, 1, . . . , N−1, where the vector z(k) ∈ Rn+ denotes the vector of energy
storage states just preceding time period k, and the input u(k) ∈ Rn denotes
the vector of net energy storage extractions during period k. The notational
convention is such that ui(k) > 0 (resp. ui(k) < 0) represents a net energy
extraction from (resp. injection into) the storage device at node i during time
period k. Without loss of generality, we assume an initial condition of z(0) = 0
for the remainder of the paper. The limited capacities of the energy storage
devices require that 0 ≤ z(k) ≤ b for all k. Iterating the linear difference
equation (2) back to its initial condition, one can express the storage capacity
constraint as
0 ≤ −
k−1∑
ℓ=0
u(ℓ) ≤ b (3)
for k = 1, . . . , N . As a matter of notational convenience, we consider an equiv-
alent characterization of the energy storage capacity constraints (3), which
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enables a decomposition of the constraints across nodes. More specifically, let-
ting ui =
[
ui(0), . . . , ui(N − 1)
]⊤
denote the entire sequence of injections and
extractions from the storage device at node i, one can recast the constraints
defined by (3) as
ui ∈ U(bi) =
{
u ∈ RN
∣∣ 0 ≤ Lu ≤ bi
}
(4)
for i = 1, . . . , n. Here, L ∈ RN×N denotes a lower triangular matrix with
entries [L]kℓ = −1 for all k ≥ ℓ, and zero otherwise. We also define bi =[
bi, . . . , bi
]⊤
∈ Rn. It is immediate to see that U(bi) is a compact polytope
containing the origin for each i = 1, . . . , n.
Remark 1 While the model of storage considered is stylized in nature, much
of the ensuing analysis and conclusions derived can be easily extended to
accommodate nonidealities in storage, such as constraints on allowable rates
of charging and discharging, roundtrip inefficiencies, and dissipative losses.
2.5 Multi-Period Economic Dispatch
Working within the idealized setting considered, we now formulate the problem
of multi-period economic dispatch with storage. Broadly, the objective of the
ISO is to select a vector of nodal prices for energy that sustains a competitive
equilibrium between supply and demand at a feasible system operating point
that maximizes social welfare – a so-called economic dispatch. Formally, the
multi-period economic dispatch problem is stated as:
minimize
N−1∑
k=0
C(v(k), k) (5)
subject to v(k) + u(k) ∈ P(c), k = 0, . . . , N − 1 (6)
ui ∈ U(bi), i = 1, . . . , n (7)
where the minimization is taken with respect to the variables v(k) ∈ Rn and
u(k) ∈ Rn for k = 0, . . . , N − 1. We will occasionally denote the decision
variables more compactly by the pair (V, U), where V =
[
v(0), . . . ,v(N − 1)
]
and U =
[
u(0), . . . ,u(N − 1)
]
.
2.6 Optimality Conditions
Definition 1 A pair (V, U) is a feasible dispatch if it satisfies constraints (6)-
(7). A pair (V, U) is an (optimal) economic dispatch if it solves problem (5)-(7).
The multi-period economic dispatch problem (5) - (7) is a convex optimiza-
tion problem with linear constraints. As such, an economic dispatch (V, U) is
characterized by the existence of Lagrange multipliers such that the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions (6) - (13) hold. More specifically, we associate
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Lagrange multipliers γ(k) ∈ R and µ(k) ∈ R2m+ with the power balance and
line flow capacity constraints (6) at time k, respectively. Similarly, we define
νi ∈ R
N
+ and νi ∈ R
N
+ as the Lagrange multipliers associated with the energy
capacity constraints (7) of the storage device at node i. In specifying the KKT
conditions, it will be convenient to define as λ(k) ∈ Rn a particular linear
combination of Lagrange multipliers given by:
λ(k) = γ(k)1−H⊤µ(k) (8)
for each time k = 0, . . . , N − 1. The stationarity condition is given by:
∇C(v(k), k) = λ(k), k = 0, . . . , N − 1 (9)
L⊤(νi − νi) = λi, i = 1, . . . , n (10)
where we have defined λi =
[
λi(0), . . . , λi(N − 1)
]⊤
. The complementary
slackness condition is given by:
µ(k) ◦ (H(v(k) + u(k))− c) = 0, k = 0, . . . , N − 1 (11)
νi ◦ Lui = 0, i = 1, . . . , n (12)
νi ◦ (bi − Lui) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n. (13)
It will occasionally prove convenient to work with alternative arrangements
of the Lagrange multipliers defined above. Accordingly, we define the vector
µℓ =
[
µℓ(0), . . . , µℓ(N − 1)
]⊤
as the sequence of Lagrange multipliers asso-
ciated with each transmission line constraint ℓ = 1, . . . , 2m. In addition, the
vectors ν(k) =
[
ν1(k), . . . , νn(k)
]⊤
and ν(k) =
[
ν1(k), . . . , νn(k)
]⊤
denote the
collection of Lagrange multipliers associated with the lower and upper bounds
on storage capacity, respectively, for each time k = 0, . . . , N − 1.
3 Financial Storage Rights
In this section, we outline the concept of financial storage rights (FSRs), and
develop their basic properties within the context of a nodal spot market for
energy. Broadly, FSRs amount to financial instruments, which enable the de-
coupling of the ownership of storage capacity from its physical operation. This
is accomplished through the allocation of financial property rights to storage in
the form of entitlements to the merchandising surplus generated by the central-
ized dispatch of the storage assets. Specifically, a FSR is defined as a sequence
of hourly injections/withdrawals at a specific node in the power network, which
yields the holder a payoff according to the corresponding sequence of nodal
spot prices. Being defined as such, FSRs provide energy market participants
the ability to hedge their intertemporal exposure to hourly price variability
at specific nodes in the power network. And while FSRs are essentially strips
of forward energy contracts, what makes this class of financial instruments
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unique is the fact that FSRs are issued under the physical cover of storage ca-
pacity and are funded by the surplus (i.e., the intertemporal arbitrage value)
that centrally operated storage generates in the spot market.
In what follows, we investigate the revenue adequacy of such instruments
in the context of electricity markets employing locational marginal pricing. In
particular, we establish conditions under which the allocation of both financial
storage and transmission rights is guaranteed to be revenue adequate, i.e.,
the merchandising surplus collected by the ISO is sufficient to cover the net
settlement to all holders of financial storage and transmission rights. We begin
with a definition of locational marginal prices under multi-period economic
dispatch with energy storage, in the following section.
3.1 Locational Marginal Pricing
We refer to λ(k) ∈ Rn as the vector of nodal prices at time k. More specifically,
the ith element, λi(k), denotes the price at which energy is transacted at
node i and time k. We denote by Λ =
[
λ(0), . . . ,λ(N − 1)
]
the corresponding
sequence of nodal prices from time k = 0 to N − 1. We have the following
standard definitions of market equilibrium and efficiency.
Definition 2 The triple (V, U, Λ) constitutes a market equilibrium if it sat-
isfies (6), (7) and (9). The triple (V, U, Λ) is said to be an efficient market
equilibrium if (V, U) is also an economic dispatch.
The requirement that (V, U) satisfy (6) and (7) in Definition 2 can be
interpreted as market clearing and feasibility conditions, respectively, as they
require that supply equal demand at each time period, while ensuring that the
line flow and storage capacity constraints are met. Condition (9) is tantamount
to requiring consumer and supplier equilibrium at every node and time period.
In other words, relation (9) requires that the marginal cost of supply (benefit
of demand) equal the nodal price λi(k) for all nodes i and time periods k.
Consequently, at equilibrium, there is no opportunity for the profitable trading
of energy across nodes or time.
It is important to note that there may exist multiple market equilibria –
some of which may not be efficient. In other words, the system operating point
at a market equilibrium may not maximize social welfare. One can, however,
implement an economic dispatch (V, U) at a market equilibrium (V, U, Λ), if the
nodal prices Λ are set according to (8) – the Lagrange multipliers derived at the
corresponding economic dispatch. Such approach to spot pricing is generally
referred to as locational marginal pricing (LMP) [32].
3.2 Merchandising Surplus
In selecting and implementing a market equilibrium (V, U, Λ), the ISO collects
payment from the consumers and remunerates the suppliers according to their
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respective operating points and nodal prices. In doing so, the ISO may collect
a nonzero surplus. We refer to this excess as the merchandising surplus (MS).
Indeed, it is a straightforward generalization of [40] to show that the MS can
be either positive or negative at an arbitrary market equilibrium. The latter
outcome is undesirable, as it may require the ISO to incur a fiscal deficit in
clearing the market. In what follows, we briefly discuss the effects of dispatch
efficiency and congestion, in both transmission and storage, on the MS. First,
we have a definition.
Definition 3 The merchandising surplus (MS) at a market equilibrium (V ,
U , Λ) is defined as
MS = −
N−1∑
k=0
n∑
i=1
λi(k)vi(k), (14)
or, equivalently, as MS = −trace(Λ⊤V ).
One can massage the expression for the MS in (3) to reveal the specific
impact that both transmission and storage congestion have on its value. In
order to do so, we must first specify the line flows induced by the net injection
profile for each time period. More formally, let (V, U) be an arbitrary feasible
dispatch. And denote by pij(k) the resulting power flow over the line from
node i to node j at time k.3 We adopt a sign convention such that pij(k) =
−pji(k) > 0, if power flows from node i to j. It follows from Kirchhoff’s Current
Law that vi(k) + ui(k) =
∑n
j=1 pij(k) for all nodes i = 1, . . . , n. Using this
relation, one can decompose the merchandising surplus as
MS = TCS + SCS. (15)
The first term in the decomposition is commonly referred to as the transmis-
sion congestion surplus (TCS). The second term, we refer to as the storage
congestion surplus (SCS). Each term satisfies:
TCS =
1
2
N−1∑
k=0
n∑
i,j=1
(λj(k)− λi(k)) pij(k), (16)
SCS =
N−1∑
k=0
n∑
i=1
λi(k)ui(k). (17)
Lemma 1 The MS, TCS, and SCS derived at an efficient market equilibrium
(V, U, Λ) are nonnegative quantities.
Lemma 1 reveals an important property. Namely, at an efficient market
equilibrium, the collective transactions between supply and demand are guar-
anteed to be revenue adequate, i.e., MS ≥ 0. Moreover, the reformulation of
the MS in (15) reveals a decomposition of the effects due to congestion in
transmission and storage on the rent collected by the ISO.
3 According to the formulation of DC power flow considered in Section 2.2, the line flow
pij(k) corresponds to a single entry of the vector H(v(k) + u(k)). And if there is no line
connecting nodes i and j, then pij(k) = −pji(k) = 0 necessarily.
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Assumption 1 For the remainder of the paper, we let (V, U, Λ) denote an
efficient market equilibrium, unless otherwise specified.
3.3 Financial Transmission Rights
In the event that there is transmission congestion at an economic dispatch and
the ISO does indeed collect a positive merchandising surplus, it is common
practice in US electricity markets to reallocate the MS in the form of financial
transmission rights [17, 23]. Financial transmission rights can be specified in
variety of ways, with the two most predominant types being defined as point-
to-point and flow-based rights.
A point-to-point financial transmission right (FTR) is specified in terms of
a quantity of power, a point of injection, and a point of withdrawal. It yields
the holder the entitlement to receive, or obligation to pay, the difference in
nodal spot prices between the chosen point of withdrawal and the point of
delivery, times the nominated quantity of power. Accordingly, an FTR may
amount to a credit or liability. We have the following definition.
Definition 4 A point-to-point financial transmission right (FTR) is any triple
(i, j, tij), where i denotes an injection node, j a withdrawal node, and tij ∈ R
N
+
an hourly power profile spanning N time periods. The FTR yields the holder a
rent (or liability) equal to (λj−λi)
⊤tij . We refer to the FTR more compactly
as tij .
Remark 2 We have implicitly required injection/extraction symmetry in our
definition of FTRs, as we have considered a lossless model of power flow.
We refer the reader to [27] for a more general characterization of FTRs that
accommodates lossy transmission networks.
FTRs have become an important component of LMP-based electricity mar-
kets, in part, because of their ability to provide market participants with an ef-
fective hedge against transmission congestion costs for long-term energy trans-
actions involving known injection and withdrawal points within the transmis-
sion network.4 Flow-based or flowgate rights (FGRs) have also been proposed
as a viable alternative or complement to FTRs [6,7,35]. Specifically, a FGR is a
link-based transmission right, specified in terms of directed transmission link,
and quantity of power flow along that link. It yields the holder the entitlement
to receive a payment equal to the Lagrange multiplier (i.e., shadow price) as-
sociated with the chosen link’s capacity constraint multiplied the nominated
quantity of power flow. Note that the rent due to a FGR is guaranteed to be
nonnegative, as the corresponding shadow prices on transmission constraints
are necessarily nonnegative. We have the following definition of FGRs accord-
ing to the model considered in this paper.
4 We refer the reader to [30] for a recent survey on financial transmission rights.
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Definition 5 A flowgate right (FGR) is any double (ℓ, f ℓ), where the index
ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , 2m} denotes a directed transmission link, and f ℓ ∈ R
N
+ a hourly
power profile spanning N time periods. The FGR yields the holder a rent of
µ⊤ℓ f ℓ. We refer to the FGR more compactly as f ℓ.
Although FGRs are not currently offered in the majority of transmission
rights auctions that are in operation today, the theoretical literature on the
subject has converged on the viewpoint that both FTRs and FGRs could and
should coexist, thereby allowing market participants the ability to decide as to
what mix of rights is best [6,23,24]. We adopt this perspective, and develop our
mathematical results in a framework that is general enough to accommodate
both types of financial rights. Accordingly, we denote an arbitrary collection
of FTRs and FGRs by the pair (T ,F), where
T = {tij | i, j = 1, . . . , n} and F = {fℓ | ℓ = 1, . . . , 2m}.
Here, tij is the sum of all FTRs of the same type (i, j), and f ℓ is the sum of
all FGRs of the same type ℓ.
In what follows, we investigate the revenue adequacy of transmission rights
in nodal spot markets based on multi-period economic dispatch with storage.
In particular, we establish conditions on the joint allocation of FTRs and
FGRs, under which the merchandising surplus collected by the ISO is sufficient
to cover their net settlement.
Definition 6 The rent due to a collection of transmission rights (T ,F) is
defined as
Φ(T ,F) =
n∑
i,j=1
(λj − λi)
⊤tij +
2m∑
ℓ=1
µ⊤ℓ f ℓ. (18)
In general, the merchandising surplus collected by the ISO will not equal the
rent due to a collection of transmission rights. Their allocation must, therefore,
be restricted in such a manner as to guarantee that the ISO does not incur
a financial shortfall. A well known requirement is the simultaneous feasibility
test (SFT) [17, 27, 40]. We now extend this notion to the multi-period setting
to accommodate the enlargement of the set of feasible power injections due to
the presence of storage capacity.
We first require additional notation. For each time period k = 0, . . . , N−1,
denote by t(k) ∈ Rn the net injection vector induced by a collection of FTRs
in T , and by f(k) ∈ R2m the vector of direction-specific flowgates induced by
a collection of FGRs in F .5
5 The ith element of the net injection vector t(k) is given by ti(k) =
∑n
j=1(tij (k)−tji(k)).
It follows that 1⊤t(k) = 0. Also, the ℓth element of the flowgate vector f(k) is given by the
kth element of the FGR f ℓ.
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Definition 7 A collection of transmission rights (T ,F) are said to be simul-
taneously feasible if there exists a sequence of storage injections Q ∈ Rn×N ,
which is feasible according to
t(k) + q(k) ∈ P(c− f (k)), k = 0, . . . , N − 1
qi ∈ U(bi), i = 1, . . . , n.
In other words, a collection of transmission rights (T ,F) are simultaneously
feasible if the sequence of nodal injections induced by the FTRs in T can be
reshaped by a feasible sequence of storage injections so that the resulting
nodal injections induce power flows that respect the transmission capacity
limits, derated according to the FGRs in F . We have the following result,
which establishes revenue adequacy for any simultaneously feasible collection
of transmission rights.
Lemma 2 If (T ,F) are a simultaneously feasible collection of transmission
rights, then their corresponding rent satisfies
Φ(T ,F) ≤ TCS. (19)
This inequality is tight, in the sense that there exists a simultaneously feasible
collection of transmission rights with a corresponding rent equal to the TCS.
Lemma 2 reveals that the transmission congestion surplus (TCS) is suffi-
cient to cover the rent due to any collection of simultaneously feasible trans-
mission rights. In the event that storage facilities congests at an economic
dispatch, the ISO will also collect, in addition to the TCS, a storage conges-
tion surplus (SCS) as part of its merchandising surplus. We, therefore, define a
new class of financial instruments, which play a complementary role to trans-
mission rights, and rely on the SCS as their primary funding source. We refer
to these new instruments as financial storage rights.
3.4 Financial Storage Rights
We begin with a definition of financial storage rights.
Definition 8 A financial storage right (FSR) is any double (i, si), where i
denotes a withdrawal node, and si ∈ R
N a hourly power profile spanning N
time periods. The FSR yields the holder a rent (or liability) equal to λ⊤i si.
We refer to the FSR more compactly as si.
Before embarking upon a formal analysis of FSRs and their properties, we
provide a brief qualitative discussion surrounding their structure and potential
use. First, FSRs can be thought as financial property rights to storage capac-
ity; or, more accurately, as entitlements to the intertemporal arbitrage gains
that storage generates under its socially optimal operation, i.e., the storage
congestion surplus (SCS). Being defined as such, FSRs enable the complete
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decoupling between the dispatch of storage facilities and the settlement of
storage congestion charges. Second, as tradable property rights, FSRs can be
sold in forward auctions coordinated by the ISO; and the revenue generated by
such auctions could serve to incentivize merchant investment in storage – not
unlike the role of FTRs in partially supporting the remuneration of merchant
transmission investments [16, 22]. Third, from the perspective of its holder, a
FSR is equivalent to a strip of forward energy contracts. Accordingly, FSRs
yield market participants the ability to perfectly hedge physical or financial
positions in the spot market against intertemporal price risk. Such hedging ca-
pabilities represent a natural complement to FTRs and their ability to hedge
spatial price risk across the network. Finally, an important factor distinguish-
ing FSRs from standard forward energy contracts, is the crucial fact that FSRs
are issued under the physical cover of storage capacity and settled against the
SCS collected by the ISO, as opposed to the revenue generated from contract
sales.
Different forms of financial entitlements to the storage infrastructure can be
envisioned. For instance, Taylor [37] proposes an alternative form of financial
storage rights, which are defined in terms of specific storage facilities, and
entitle their holder to receive the shadow price on a storage facility’s energy
capacity constraint times the nominated quantity of energy. We refer to this
alternative form of financial rights as energy capacity rights (ECRs). Working
within the confines of our idealized storage model, ECRs can be formally
defined as follows.
Definition 9 An energy capacity right (ECR) is any double (i, ei), where the
index i denotes a storage asset, and ei ∈ R
N
+ a hourly energy profile spanning
N time periods. The ECR yields the holder a rent of ν⊤i ei. We refer to the
ECR more compactly as ei.
In the presence of additional constraints, which limit the rate at which a
storage facility can be charged or discharged, one can expand the definition
of ECRs to include another class of financial rights that entitle their holder
to receive the shadow price on the storage facility’s power capacity constraint
times the nominated quantity of power. Taylor [37] refers to such instruments
as power capacity rights (PCRs).
Definition 9 is in contrast to our profile-based definition of FSRs (cf. Defi-
nition 8). Intuitively, the relationship between FSRs and ECRs is analogous to
the relationship between FTRs and FGRs. And, to a large extent, the advan-
tages and disadvantages of FSRs versus ECRs mirror those of FTRs as com-
pared to FGRs.6 For example, while FTRs (FSRs) are convenient instruments
for hedging spatial (intertemporal) price risk, FGRs (ECRs) are instruments
better suited for remunerating property rights to specific transmission lines
(storage facilities).
In Section 3.5, we present conditions on the joint offering of transmission
and storage rights under which the ISO is guaranteed to be revenue adequate.
6 We refer the reader to [6,23–25,31] for detailed discussions surrounding such comparisons
in the context of transmission rights.
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To that end, we first define the rent due to a collection of FSRs and ECRs. We
denote an arbitrary collection of FSRs and ECRs by the pair (S, E), where
S = {si | i = 1, . . . , n} and E = {ei | i = 1, . . . , n}.
Here, si is the sum of all FSRs of the same type i, and ei is the sum of all
ECRs of the same type i.
Definition 10 The rent due to a collection of storage rights (S, E) is defined
as
Σ(S, E) =
n∑
i=1
λ⊤i si + ν
⊤
i ei.
3.5 A Generalized Simultaneous Feasibility Test
We now extend our definition of multi-period simultaneous feasibility to ac-
commodate a combination of both transmission and storage rights.
Definition 11 A collection of transmission and storage rights (T ,F ,S, E) are
said to be simultaneously feasible if there exists a sequence of storage injections
Q ∈ Rn×N , which is feasible according to
t(k)− s(k) + q(k) ∈ P(c− f(k)), k = 0, . . . , N − 1
qi ∈ U(bi − ei), i = 1, . . . , n.
Remark 3 (Accommodating Inefficiencies in Storage) While we have thus far
operated under the assumption of perfectly efficient storage facilities, it is
straightforward to extend the definition of simultaneous feasibility in Defi-
nition 11 to accommodate dissipative losses and conversion inefficiencies in
storage by simply refining the underlying storage constraints on which it is
based.
Essentially, a collection of transmission and storage rights are simultane-
ously feasible if the nodal injections induced by the FTRs in T and FSRs in
S can be reshaped by a sequence of storage injections, which both respect
the storage capacity constraints (derated according to the ECRs in E), and
result in power flows that do not violate the transmission capacity constraints
(derated according to the FGRs in F). Notice that, in the absence of storage
rights, this generalized definition of simultaneously feasibility reduces to Def-
inition 7. The following result characterizes the maximum rent achievable by
any simultaneously feasible collection of transmission and storage rights.
Theorem 1 If (T ,F ,S, E) are a simultaneously feasible collection of trans-
mission and storage rights, then their corresponding rent satisfies
Φ(T ,F) + Σ(S, E) ≤ MS. (20)
Moreover, this inequality is tight, in the sense that there exists a simultaneously
feasible collection of rights (T ,F ,S, E) with an associated rent equal to MS.
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Theorem 1 is reassuring, as it guarantees revenue adequacy on behalf of
the ISO when jointly issuing transmission and storage rights in a manner
that is simultaneously feasible. More precisely, given a fixed configuration of
transmission and storage facilities, the MS collected by the ISO in the spot
market suffices to cover the rents of all outstanding transmission and storage
rights. Revenue adequacy is not, however, guaranteed in the event of unplanned
contingencies, as the configuration of transmission and/or storage facilities
may deviate from what was assumed in the simultaneous feasibility test (SFT).
The ISO must, therefore, specify a mechanism to compensate potential revenue
shortfalls that might arise in the event that such contingencies occur.7
Remark 4 (Expanding the SFT via Short Positions) In [25], Oren describes
how the allowance of short positions on long term flowgate rights (FGRs)
might serve to incentivize the maintenance and incremental upgrade of certain
transmission lines to enhance their capacity in real time. For instance, a 1
MW short FGR position on a particular line serves to enlarge the capacity
of that same line by 1 MW in the simultaneous feasibility test (SFT) used to
clear the forward transmission rights auction. The holder of the short FGR
is paid the forward shadow price on that line determined by the transmission
rights auction under the enlarged SFT, and is required to pay to the spot
shadow price on that line in real time. Ultimately, the holder of the short FGR
makes a profit if the transmission line in question turns out to be uncongested
in real time. Such instruments are most naturally utilized by those market
participants with the ability to maintain or upgrade transmission line ratings
in real time, e.g., transmission line owners. One can envisage an analogous
role that could be played by short positions on energy capacity rights (ECRs).
That is to say, the allowance of short positions on long term ECRs might
serve to finance investments in storage capacity, or related technologies with
load flattening capabilities, while allowing the ISO to allocate long term FSRs
against such investments. Such instruments would be well suited to market
participants with the ability to shape demand over time, such as load serving
entities, demand response providers, and energy storage owners.
7 We refer the reader to [25, Sec. 3.6], which examines several mechanisms to cover rev-
enue shortfalls that might occur when settling payments to FTR holders in the event of
transmission line contingencies. For example, PJM handles revenue inadequacy in settling
FTR payments by prorating the revenue shortfall among the FTR holders; whereas, in
NYISO-run markets, transmission line owners are held responsible for the shortfall [23]. A
mechanism of the former type generally transfers the risk of shortfall to the FTR holders,
undermines the ability of FTRs to provide perfect price hedges, and is vulnerable to gaming
due to the socialization of the shortfalls. Conversely, a mechanism of the latter type fully
funds the outstanding rights, thereby transferring the risk of shortfall to the transmission
line owners themselves. An argument in favor of such a mechanism is that it provides an
incentive to transmission line owners to effectively maintain their assets, and avoids the
socialization of revenue shortfalls among the FTR holders [23, 25].
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4 An Illustration of the Use of FSRs
The natural variation of nodal spot prices over both location and time ex-
poses market participants to price risk. Extreme price volatility is particularly
problematic for load serving entities (LSEs) that sell electricity to end-use cus-
tomers at a fixed and predetermined price, as they face the risk that the spot
price at which they pay for energy may considerably exceed the fixed price
at which they are remunerated during certain hours of the day. Accordingly,
LSEs and, more generally, those market participants seeking price stability in
their transactions, may wish to hedge their exposure to such price risk. In the
following discussion, we explain how FSRs, in combination with contracts for
differences (CFDs) and FTRs, can be employed to fully hedge a long-term
bilateral contract for energy, when the seller and buyer may exhibit differing
intertemporal supply and demand characteristics, respectively. As a special
case, the framework considered accommodates the setting in which the seller
is physically constrained to deliver the contracted amount of energy through a
constant power profile over a predetermined interval of time, while the buyer
is compelled to consume that amount of energy according a power profile that
(predictably) fluctuates over that same interval of time, due in part to the
inelastic nature of its demand.
We consider the setting in which a demander at node j would like to buy an
amount of energy qc (MWh) from a supplier at node i to be delivered over N
time periods at a fixed price λc ($/MWh). The supplier is assumed to deliver
this quantity of energy according to the production profile qi ∈ R
N , while
the demander is assumed to consume that same amount of energy according
to the consumption profile qj ∈ R
N . While the production and consumption
profiles need not agree at any given time period, they must balance over time,
i.e., 1⊤qi = 1
⊤qj = qc. In addition, it is assumed that both the demander and
supplier are required to trade with the ISO according to their respective nodal
spot prices. Accordingly, the demander pays λ⊤j qj , and supplier is paid λ
⊤
i qi
in the spot market. Because nodal spot prices will naturally vary over both
time and location, and will therefore differ from the contract price λc, a hedge
is required in order to execute the fixed price contract between the supplier
and demander. In what follows, we explain how a combination of a CFD, FTR,
and FSR can be employed to perfectly hedge such price differences.
In general, the supplier will lose an amount λcqc−λ
⊤
i qi and the demander
will gain an amount λcqc − λ
⊤
j qj, as a result of their respective spot market
transactions.8 In the event that nodal spot prices are constant over both loca-
tion and time, it is straightforward to see that the amount lost by the supplier
is equal to the amount gained by the demander. Thus, a simple money trans-
fer between the two parties in that amount is sufficient to perfectly hedge the
fixed price contract. Such transfer can be accomplished with a CFD, which
8 Clearly, each of these amounts is as equally likely to be negative as positive, depending
on the specific values of the contract price and nodal spot prices.
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requires that the demander pay the supplier the amount λcqc − λ
⊤
i qi, as is
recorded in the second line of Table 1.
More generally, the CFD specified above leaves the demander exposed to a
transmission congestion charge when nodal spot prices vary over location, and
a storage congestion charge when nodal spot prices vary over time.9 The spe-
cific form these congestion charges is made explicit in the following expression
(21), which disentangles the individual effects that locational and temporal
price differences have on the demander’s market exposure after having settled
the CFD with the supplier.
λ⊤j qj︸ ︷︷ ︸
spot market
charge
+ (λcqc − λ
⊤
i qi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
CFD charge
= λcqc + (λj − λi)
⊤qi︸ ︷︷ ︸
transmission congestion
charge
+ λ⊤j (qj − qi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
storage congestion
charge
(21)
It is straightforward to see that the transmission (storage) congestion charge
vanishes when the nodal spot prices are constant across location (time). In
the event that nodal spot prices vary over location, the resulting transmission
congestion charge can be perfectly hedged with a FTR from node i to node j
given by tij := qi. Similarly, a FSR at node j given by sj := qj − qi yields a
perfect hedge against the storage congestion charge, in the event that nodal
spot prices vary across time.10 Essentially, this FSR yields the demander a
hedge, which is identical to that which could have been produced using a
physical storage facility to purchase the profile qi − qj in the spot market at
node j.
In combination with the CFD, the procurement of a FTR and a FSR
by the demander yields a perfectly hedged, fixed price contract between the
supplier and demander – provided that both parties deliver and consume power
according to the profiles specified by the contract. However, as is argued in [5],
such price risk cannot be costlessly eliminated, as FTRs and FSRs will, in
general, have nonzero value in expectation. We refer the reader to Table 1 for
a detailed accounting of the transactions described in the preceding discussion.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed a general regulatory and market framework
to enable the open access integration of storage, in which storage is treated
as a communal asset accessible by all market participants. Such an approach
represents a substantial departure from the more standard storage integration
9 Of course, this is but one of several natural ways in which the CFD might be specified.
Alternative specifications that entail risk sharing between the supplier and demander can
also be envisaged.
10 It is worth mentioning that, should the two parties enter into a bilateral contract spec-
ifying common production and consumption profiles, i.e., qi = qj , the storage congestion
charge would vanish – thereby eliminating the need for the procurement of a FSR in the
pursuit of a perfectly hedged, fixed price contract.
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Table 1 Using CFDs, FTRs, and FSRs to synthesize bilateral contracts.
Contract or Market
Supplier at node i Demander at node j
Quantity Payment Quantity Payment
1 Spot market qi λ
⊤
i qi −qj −λ
⊤
j qj
2 CFD qi λcqc − λ
⊤
i qi −qi −(λcqc − λ
⊤
i qi)
3 FTR – – tij := qi (λj − λi)
⊤tij
4 FSR – – sj := qj − qi λ
⊤
j sj
5 Total – λcqc – −λcqc
paradigm in which a storage owner-operator pursues her individual profit max-
imizing interests within the confines of her local spot market. Central to our
proposal is the concept of financial storage rights (FSRs), which are defined
as a sequence of nodal power injections and withdrawals that yield the holder
a payment according to the corresponding sequence of nodal prices. Quali-
tatively, FSRs represent financial property rights to the capacity of centrally
operated storage facilities. This is in sharp contrast to the physical rights pro-
posed in [12]. An essential advantage of FSRs and the modus operandi they
entail is that their allocation does not interfere with the socially optimal op-
eration of storage or the independence of the ISO, regardless of the ownership
structure of the storage facilities. Most importantly, FSRs enable the synthe-
sis of fully hedged, fixed-price bilateral contracts for energy, when the seller
and buyer exhibit differing intertemporal supply and demand characteristics,
respectively.
More broadly, we envision storage owners trading such FSRs with other
market participants through (short and long term) forward auctions and sec-
ondary markets centrally coordinated by the ISO; not unlike markets for FTRs
today. And, by selling financial rights to their energy storage capacity in var-
ious forward auctions (e.g., yearly, quarterly, etc.), storage owners can more
finely manage their exposure to spot price volatility. In addition, the allowance
of short positions on long term ECRs might serve to finance investments in
storage capacity, or related technologies with load flattening capabilities, while
allowing the ISO to issue long term FSRs against such investments. Also, the
auction revenue derived from the forward sale of FSRs may serve as a transpar-
ent long term market signal to partially guide merchant investment in storage.
The study of financial storage rights presented in this paper represents
an initial point of analysis. Many interesting questions remain. First, how
should the ISO structure an auction mechanism to jointly allocate both finan-
cial transmission and storage rights? For instance, the simultaneous feasibility
test (SFT) that we propose would require coordination in clearing both the
transmission and storage right auctions. This might be too cumbersome to be
practical. Accordingly, it would be of interest to explore the design of alterna-
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tive conditions for simultaneous feasibility that would enable the decoupling
of transmission and storage right auctions. Second, the potential value that
energy storage offers to the power system goes well beyond the application
of intertemporal energy arbitrage considered in this paper [34]. For example,
certain storage technologies posses the capability of providing voltage support
or frequency regulation services. A natural question then, is how might one
expand the concept of FSRs to incorporate these value streams as well? Third,
it would be of interest to generalize the market framework considered to ac-
commodate a broader family of technologies capable of shifting energy in time
(e.g., flexible demand-side resources).
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Proof of Lemma 1
Let (V, U,Λ) denote an efficient market equilibrium throughout. And, let (λ(k), γ(k), µ(k),
νi, νi) denote the corresponding Lagrange multipliers satisfying the KKT conditions (6)-
(13) for all k and i. We prove the desired result by establishing nonnegativity of both the
TCS and SCS.
Proposition 1 TCS =
∑N−1
k=0
µ(k)⊤c ≥ 0.
Proof We have that TCS = −
∑N−1
k=0
λ(k)⊤(v(k) + u(k)) based on its definition in (16).
Substituting for λ(k) according to Equation (8), and using the fact that 1⊤(v(k)+u(k)) = 0
for all k, we have that
TCS =
N−1∑
k=0
µ(k)⊤H(v(k) + u(k)).
The complementary slackness condition (11) yields TCS =
∑N−1
k=0
µ(k)⊤c, which is clearly
nonnegative. 
Proposition 2 SCS =
∑n
i=1 ν
⊤
i bi ≥ 0.
Proof We have that SCS =
∑n
i=1 λ
⊤
i ui based on its definition in (17). A direct substitution
of the stationarity condition (10) and complementary slackness conditions (12)-(13) yields
SCS =
n∑
i=1
ν⊤i Lui − ν
⊤
i Lui =
n∑
i=1
ν⊤i bi,
which is clearly nonnegative. 
The desired result follows from Propositions 1 and 2, as MS = TCS + SCS.
Proof of Lemma 2
Let (V, U,Λ) denote an efficient market equilibrium throughout the proof. Also, let γ(k) and
µ(k) denote the corresponding Lagrange multipliers associated with the power balance and
line flow capacity constraints for each time period k = 0, . . . , N − 1. The maximum rent
achievable by any simultaneously feasible collection of transmission rights is given by the
optimal value of
maximize Φ(T ,F) (22)
subject to t(k) + q(k) ∈ P(c− f(k)), k = 0, . . . , N − 1 (23)
qi ∈ U(bi), i = 1, . . . , n, (24)
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where Φ(T ,F) =
∑N−1
k=0
−λ(k)⊤t(k) + µ(k)⊤f(k). It is not difficult to show (by induction)
tha any feasible solution of problem (22)-(24) must satisfy qi = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n. This stems
from the injection/extraction symmetry required by our definition of FTRs (which implies
that 1⊤t(k) = 0 for k = 0, . . . , N−1), and our assumption of zero initial stored energy. One
can, therefore, equivalently reformulate problem (22)-(24) as
maximize Φ(T ,F) (25)
subject to t(k) ∈ P(c− f(k)), k = 0, . . . , N − 1. (26)
This is a convex optimization problem with linear constraints in the decision variables
t(k) ∈ Rn and f(k) ∈ R2m+ (k = 0, . . . , N − 1). It follows that a primal optimal solution
is characterized by the existence of Lagrange multipliers γ˜(k) ∈ R and µ˜(k) ∈ R2m+ (k =
0, . . . , N − 1) such that the KKT conditions (26)-(29) hold. The stationarity condition is
given by:
γ˜(k)1−H⊤µ˜(k)− λ(k) = 0, k = 0, . . . , N − 1 (27)
µ˜(k)− µ(k) = 0, k = 0, . . . , N − 1. (28)
The complementary slackness condition is given by:
µ˜(k) ◦ (Ht(k)− c+ f(k)) = 0, k = 0, . . . , N − 1. (29)
Recall that (V, U,Λ) and γ(k), µ(k) satisfy the KKT conditions (6), (8) and (11) associated
with multi-period economic dispatch problem. It follows that a primal optimal solution to
problem (25)-(26) is given by
t(k) = v(k) + u(k) and f(k) = 0, k = 0, . . . , N − 1.
This optimal solution yields a collection of transmission rights with an associated rent of
Φ(T ,F) =
N−1∑
k=0
−λ(k)⊤t(k) =
N−1∑
k=0
−λ(k)⊤(v(k) + u(k)).
Upon examination of Equations (14)-(17), it is straightforward to verify that the right-hand
side equals the TCS associated with (V,U, Λ), thus completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1
Let (V, U, Λ) denote an efficient market equilibrium, and let γ(k), µ(k) (k = 0, . . . , N − 1)
and νi, νi (i = 1, . . . , n) denote the corresponding Lagrange multipliers. The maximum
rent achievable by any simultaneously feasible collection of transmission and storage rights
is given by the optimal value of
maximize Φ(T ,F) + Σ(S, E) (30)
subject to t(k)− s(k) + q(k) ∈ P(c − f(k)), k = 0, . . . , N − 1 (31)
qi ∈ U(bi − ei), i = 1, . . . , n, (32)
where the objective function is given by
Φ(T ,F) + Σ(S, E) =
N−1∑
k=0
(
−λ(k)⊤t(k) + µ(k)⊤f(k)
)
+
n∑
i=1
(
λ⊤i si + ν
⊤
i ei
)
.
This is a convex optimization problem with linear constraints in the decision variables t(k),
f(k), q(k), s(k) (k = 0, . . . , N − 1) and ei (i = 1, . . . , n). Using arguments identical to those
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employed in the proof of Lemma 2, it is straightforward to verify that an optimal solution
to problem (30)-(32) is given by
t(k) = v(k) + u(k), f(k) = 0, q(k) = u(k), s(k) = u(k), and ei = 0
for all k = 0, . . . , N − 1 and i = 1, . . . , n. This optimal solution yields a collection of
transmission and storage rights with an associated rent of
Φ(T ,F) + Σ(S, E) = −
N−1∑
k=0
λ(k)⊤v(k).
According to (14), this equals the MS associated with (V, U,Λ), thus completing the proof.
